Gettysburg Auto Tour
1 July 2026 05:50 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
dime_novel_heroFor my vacation in Gettysburg, I purchased the Self-guided Auto Tour from ActionTourGuide.com having seen it highly recommended online. In my last visit to the battlefield several decades ago, I had used the National Park Service tour on CD and thought this app, loaded on my cell phone with GPS prompting, would be more complete and easier to follow.
Herein follows the letter I wrote to Action Tour Guide concerning their product.
I am not a historian but I am a history enthusiast. I have read any number of books and have watched many documentaries and short video presentations. I have myself presented at many conventions over the past decade and more on varying topics of 19th Century science, technology, and history. More important than that experience, though, is that I know how to check my sources and research with reputable and even primary sources before expounding on a topic before an audience.
In your case, this appears not to have been done with sufficient rigor. Right off the bat, at the very beginning of the tour:
No.
It was the Confederacy that was desperate for a victory with the near impossible goal of ending the war that had gone on for two brutal years with a daring end run around the Union army to attack Harrisburg, Philadelphia, and perhaps even Washington, or to defeat the Union army in a single, decisive battle. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia entered Pennsylvania with roughly 75,000 soldiers. The Army of the Potomac in pursuit outnumbered the Confederates with about 100,000 men. Lee was in enemy territory, having to steal supplies from locals to support his already underfed army. He had split his forces in multiple parts and scattered them across the Pennsylvania countryside to forage. He was unfamiliar with the terrain. His cavalry under Stewart was out of touch and providing him no intelligence of the Union army’s movements or disposition. Once engaged at Gettysburg, he had to wait to gather his forces while the Union army held the high ground at all times. The Union had the advantage through the entire campaign.
“Here, Confederate forces staged a nearly impossible attack into the North – and rightfully got their asses kicked.”
I could grant that this introductory statement was presented with dramatic license but, in the very next section:
Amazing. Everything you said was wrong.
Columbia wasn’t his first aim by a long shot. Jubal Early was a Confederate general under Lee’s command, not part of the Union opposition. As a Confederate, Early did not command a regiment of Black soldiers. Lee did not turn to Gettysburg because the Union appeared vulnerable there.
My best guess concerning what this part of the narrative is supposed to convey is that in late June, as Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia invades central Pennsylvania, a flying division under the command of Jubal Early captured York. From there, he sent a brigade east under General John B. Gordon to cross the Susquehanna River at the Columbia-Wrightsville Bridge into the town of Columbia and from there, attack Lancaster, and then move north to capture Harrisburg.
Gordon was met by several companies of Pennsylvania Militia, one of those was composed of black soldiers. Outnumbered five to one, the Union militia retreated after a short delaying fight and attempted to demolish the bridge with explosives. When that failed to deliver enough damage, they set it alight with coal oil and kerosene.
Shortly after this, Lee recalled Early’s division to join the rest of the army at South Mountain. His army was spread out all over central Pennsylvania and, as Union forces came up from the south, Lee needed to bring all his forces back together to meet them. Gettysburg was a hub with roads coming into it from seven different directions and was a natural congregation point. He didn’t know the Union was vulnerable there. In fact, he didn’t even know the Union was there. Because it wasn’t there. They were still on the march. And, in issuing his recall order, I’m not sure that Lee was aware that the bridge had been burned.
I get that you wanted to tell this story in a single, quick paragraph, but in so doing, you got it very, very wrong.
Next to the wheatfield.
While dramatic and almost cinematic, it is not the way things unfolded in the Wheatfield.
General Sickles had already moved his units off of Cemetery Ridge to Rose Woods and the Peach Orchard when the attack began. He had seen the rise as a better vantage to defend against Confederate advance from the Devil’s Den to the south and the bulk of the forces on Seminary Ridge. (He was wrong.) They didn’t advance because they saw Confederates attacking, they advanced to block an expected advance that hadn’t happened yet. And they did not see Confederates sneaking through the wheatfield because the wheatfield was behind the Union line when the fighting started.
And it is my understanding that wheat, like that planted in that field to this day, grows to about thee or four feet. Even at its full chest height, it would not be tall enough to conceal a Confederate brigade.
Additionally, Union troops marched through the wheatfield to take up position along a stone wall on the edge of the woods, laying down much of the wheat. By the time they were pushed back by advancing Confederate forces, the wheat would be completely trampled. No wheat for them to stir in.
Are you confusing this with Miller’s Cornfield at Antietam? Are you not aware that advancing through a field like that does not conceal movement but does make it nearly impossible for the advancing soldiers to see the enemy on the far side? Did you just make it all up for dramatic effect? In any case, nothing happened as you described.
The next textual instance that had me literally yelling at the cell phone on my dashboard came on Cemetery Ridge:
What the actual fuck! No, really. Where are you getting this from because in no way, shape, or form did Pickett “take command of the operation.”
Lieutenant General James Longstreet commanded a Confederate Army corps and had three divisions. Those divisions were commanded by Pettigrew, Trimble, and Major General George Pickett. Longstreet did disagree with Lee’s decision but Lee did not take the command away from corps commander Longstreet to give to the lower ranking and less experienced division commander Pickett. Longstreet followed Lee’s orders and continued in his command.
For all the mistakes and dramatic license taken by Ron Moore in the 1993 movie “Gettysburg”, bordering on Lost Cause propaganda itself, even he didn’t get this wrong.
It became known as Pickett’s Charge not because Pickett was in command of the entire operation but because he was the most flamboyant of the division commanders, was a Virginian commanding mostly Virginians in the Army of Northern Virginia, won the argument with North Carolina over who was to blame for the attack’s failure, and is credited with delivering one of the most memorable post-battle lines in movie history.
It’s known as Pickett’s Charge because of politics and propaganda.
And these are just the errors I recognized during the tour. They are so egregious, so counter-factual, that I can only conclude that there are many other mistakes to be found. I’m sure if I sifted through the narrative again, I would find more.
But that’s not my job. It’s a job you should have done well before recording.
I am also sure that these errors have been pointed out to you previously. I can’t imagine that all of the thousands of enthusiasts, more enthusiastic and knowledgeable than I am, took this tour and just let these errors go unreported over the many years it has been available. These things have been pointed out to you, assuredly numerous times, and you have actively decided NOT to correct them.
Action Tour Guide, not only will I not recommend your product, I will actively work to dissuade people visiting these sites from engaging with your product. My bundle purchase of the Antietam tour, expecting to visit that battlefield again perhaps later this year, will be deleted from my phone. The information presented simply cannot be trusted and the events at these battlefields are too important to be left to those so unconcerned with accuracy.
Herein follows the letter I wrote to Action Tour Guide concerning their product.
I am not a historian but I am a history enthusiast. I have read any number of books and have watched many documentaries and short video presentations. I have myself presented at many conventions over the past decade and more on varying topics of 19th Century science, technology, and history. More important than that experience, though, is that I know how to check my sources and research with reputable and even primary sources before expounding on a topic before an audience.
In your case, this appears not to have been done with sufficient rigor. Right off the bat, at the very beginning of the tour:
“Here, Union forces staged a nearly impossible defense against Confederate attackers – and won!”
No.
It was the Confederacy that was desperate for a victory with the near impossible goal of ending the war that had gone on for two brutal years with a daring end run around the Union army to attack Harrisburg, Philadelphia, and perhaps even Washington, or to defeat the Union army in a single, decisive battle. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia entered Pennsylvania with roughly 75,000 soldiers. The Army of the Potomac in pursuit outnumbered the Confederates with about 100,000 men. Lee was in enemy territory, having to steal supplies from locals to support his already underfed army. He had split his forces in multiple parts and scattered them across the Pennsylvania countryside to forage. He was unfamiliar with the terrain. His cavalry under Stewart was out of touch and providing him no intelligence of the Union army’s movements or disposition. Once engaged at Gettysburg, he had to wait to gather his forces while the Union army held the high ground at all times. The Union had the advantage through the entire campaign.
“Here, Confederate forces staged a nearly impossible attack into the North – and rightfully got their asses kicked.”
I could grant that this introductory statement was presented with dramatic license but, in the very next section:
“Lee first aims to enter Columbia, but a regiment of Black soldiers under General Jubal Early burns a bridge and blocks his way. This temporary setback ends up changing the course of the war. Lee points his army instead towards Gettysburg, where Union forces appear vulnerable.”
Amazing. Everything you said was wrong.
Columbia wasn’t his first aim by a long shot. Jubal Early was a Confederate general under Lee’s command, not part of the Union opposition. As a Confederate, Early did not command a regiment of Black soldiers. Lee did not turn to Gettysburg because the Union appeared vulnerable there.
My best guess concerning what this part of the narrative is supposed to convey is that in late June, as Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia invades central Pennsylvania, a flying division under the command of Jubal Early captured York. From there, he sent a brigade east under General John B. Gordon to cross the Susquehanna River at the Columbia-Wrightsville Bridge into the town of Columbia and from there, attack Lancaster, and then move north to capture Harrisburg.
Gordon was met by several companies of Pennsylvania Militia, one of those was composed of black soldiers. Outnumbered five to one, the Union militia retreated after a short delaying fight and attempted to demolish the bridge with explosives. When that failed to deliver enough damage, they set it alight with coal oil and kerosene.
Shortly after this, Lee recalled Early’s division to join the rest of the army at South Mountain. His army was spread out all over central Pennsylvania and, as Union forces came up from the south, Lee needed to bring all his forces back together to meet them. Gettysburg was a hub with roads coming into it from seven different directions and was a natural congregation point. He didn’t know the Union was vulnerable there. In fact, he didn’t even know the Union was there. Because it wasn’t there. They were still on the march. And, in issuing his recall order, I’m not sure that Lee was aware that the bridge had been burned.
I get that you wanted to tell this story in a single, quick paragraph, but in so doing, you got it very, very wrong.
Next to the wheatfield.
“While fighting rages on at Little Round Top, now behind us, Union soldiers stationed here notice something strange. . . Is something stirring in the wheat?
Yes – Confederate soldiers! They’re charging towards Cemetery Hill, where the center of the Union is vulnerable!
The Union men surge forward to prevent this attack.”
Yes – Confederate soldiers! They’re charging towards Cemetery Hill, where the center of the Union is vulnerable!
The Union men surge forward to prevent this attack.”
While dramatic and almost cinematic, it is not the way things unfolded in the Wheatfield.
General Sickles had already moved his units off of Cemetery Ridge to Rose Woods and the Peach Orchard when the attack began. He had seen the rise as a better vantage to defend against Confederate advance from the Devil’s Den to the south and the bulk of the forces on Seminary Ridge. (He was wrong.) They didn’t advance because they saw Confederates attacking, they advanced to block an expected advance that hadn’t happened yet. And they did not see Confederates sneaking through the wheatfield because the wheatfield was behind the Union line when the fighting started.
And it is my understanding that wheat, like that planted in that field to this day, grows to about thee or four feet. Even at its full chest height, it would not be tall enough to conceal a Confederate brigade.
Additionally, Union troops marched through the wheatfield to take up position along a stone wall on the edge of the woods, laying down much of the wheat. By the time they were pushed back by advancing Confederate forces, the wheat would be completely trampled. No wheat for them to stir in.
Are you confusing this with Miller’s Cornfield at Antietam? Are you not aware that advancing through a field like that does not conceal movement but does make it nearly impossible for the advancing soldiers to see the enemy on the far side? Did you just make it all up for dramatic effect? In any case, nothing happened as you described.
The next textual instance that had me literally yelling at the cell phone on my dashboard came on Cemetery Ridge:
“It’s July 3rd. Lee confides his ambitious plan to Longstreet: he wants to send a massive charge directly at the center of Union lines on Cemetery Hill. Longstreet disagrees, unconvinced that another such attack will succeed. He’s overruled and General Pickett takes command of the hail-mary operation.”
What the actual fuck! No, really. Where are you getting this from because in no way, shape, or form did Pickett “take command of the operation.”
Lieutenant General James Longstreet commanded a Confederate Army corps and had three divisions. Those divisions were commanded by Pettigrew, Trimble, and Major General George Pickett. Longstreet did disagree with Lee’s decision but Lee did not take the command away from corps commander Longstreet to give to the lower ranking and less experienced division commander Pickett. Longstreet followed Lee’s orders and continued in his command.
For all the mistakes and dramatic license taken by Ron Moore in the 1993 movie “Gettysburg”, bordering on Lost Cause propaganda itself, even he didn’t get this wrong.
It became known as Pickett’s Charge not because Pickett was in command of the entire operation but because he was the most flamboyant of the division commanders, was a Virginian commanding mostly Virginians in the Army of Northern Virginia, won the argument with North Carolina over who was to blame for the attack’s failure, and is credited with delivering one of the most memorable post-battle lines in movie history.
It’s known as Pickett’s Charge because of politics and propaganda.
And these are just the errors I recognized during the tour. They are so egregious, so counter-factual, that I can only conclude that there are many other mistakes to be found. I’m sure if I sifted through the narrative again, I would find more.
But that’s not my job. It’s a job you should have done well before recording.
I am also sure that these errors have been pointed out to you previously. I can’t imagine that all of the thousands of enthusiasts, more enthusiastic and knowledgeable than I am, took this tour and just let these errors go unreported over the many years it has been available. These things have been pointed out to you, assuredly numerous times, and you have actively decided NOT to correct them.
Action Tour Guide, not only will I not recommend your product, I will actively work to dissuade people visiting these sites from engaging with your product. My bundle purchase of the Antietam tour, expecting to visit that battlefield again perhaps later this year, will be deleted from my phone. The information presented simply cannot be trusted and the events at these battlefields are too important to be left to those so unconcerned with accuracy.
